This paper illustrates how theory and evidence have been, and may be, quantitatively linked in the historical study of entrepreneurship, thereby allowing judgements about entrepreneurship's causes and effects with increasing precision. First is considered the implications of identifying entrepreneurs with business founders, and the corresponding measure of entrepreneurship, the number of new firms established. The supply of entrepreneurship is then analysed as a choice between employment, selfemployment and, in some circumstances, unemployment. Either the well being, or the expected profit, income or wealth, from the employment options are the objects of choice. Profit or wealth is therefore contemplated as a possible indicator of entrepreneurial performance in particular contexts. The determinants of entrepreneurship are the factors that influence the choice of employment. Credit rationing is especially addressed, since even small businesses require capital, which may not always accompany entrepreneurial talent. The focus then shifts to distinctive historical measurement and estimation problems, including those arising from entrepreneurial culture and social mobility. The survey goes on to address measures of entrepreneurial optimisation, concentrating first on choice of technique of production and then on total factor productivity indices that embody this choice, distinguishing aggregate performance from that of the individual entrepreneur. Examples show how the choice of production technique approach can be extended to product selection and entrepreneurial success, as well as quantifying the gains from reducing the dispersion in entrepreneurial performance.
Chapter 4. Measuring Historical Entrepreneurship

James Foreman-Peck
Measuring entrepreneurship, assigning numbers to the concept, requires identification of who is or is not an entrepreneur, and therefore what entrepreneurs do i . One approach represents entrepreneurs as identifying and exploiting profit opportunities resulting from market disequilibria, so eliminating this profit and balancing the market (Kirzener 1973) . Another links entrepreneurship with innovation (Schumpeter 1961) . Entrepreneurship might then perhaps be measured by profit stemming from innovation. Profit corresponds with the 'adding value' indicator of entrepreneurial performance (Kay 1993 Ch.2) . But actual profits may be as much a symptom of lack of competition (as in the 'persistence of profits' literature, for example Geroski and Jacquemin 1988) , as of successful innovation. Ideally the profits should be rewards for successfully bearing uncertainty, rather than for the exercise of monopoly power (cf Knight 1921).
For some purposes, productivity may be a more satisfactory measure of socially desirable entrepreneurship. In principle the contribution to productivity increase of new industry entrants, clearly performing an entrepreneurial function, can be distinguished from that of established and surviving businesses on the one hand and exiting businesses on the other (eg Disney, Haskell and Heden 2003) . This solution is by no means complete however for at least two reasons.
First, supposing that the productivity of successful process innovation is identified, the impact of product innovation is more difficult to take into account. While a successful process innovation for an existing product will reduce inputs and raise productivity, prices are a less satisfactory indicator of the willingness to pay for product innovations ii . Second, a competitive industry is likely to need continual flourishing innovation among survivors, so that long-lived established businesses in such industries will exhibit entrepreneurial behaviour as well. The rise of the corporate economy has meant the institutionalising of entrepreneurship iii . A distinction between entrepreneurship on the one hand, and management on the other, is therefore not easy to draw in practice. The chief executive will generally take the credit for high corporate achievement iv . But the source of successful innovation may well be elsewhere in the company. In any case the grounds for discriminating between 'intrapreneurship' and entrepreneurship do not seem strong. Professional managers who are associated with high performing firms may as well be accorded the same status as founders or inheritors of growth businesses.
No measure of entrepreneurship is likely to be satisfactory for all purposes, but some can be more suitable for answering specific questions than others. Entrepreneurs are conventionally attributed with the introduction and diffusion of new products, processes and organisations, which is why they are often assigned key roles in the success or failure of whole economies. The interest in measuring entrepreneurship stems from a concern with such consequences and their causes.
Though only a very few of the huge number of firms spawned are really successful, the long term economic significance of truly dynamic businesses, and the entrepreneurs that run them, is immense. Consequently the conditions that give rise to The profit accumulated by the founder of a business is more likely a return to entrepreneurship than the profits of a large corporation. How much profit the founder retains, and indeed how much they are able to make, will depend upon the rules and conditions of the society in which they operate. What makes entrepreneurs, what they achieve and how they accomplish it depend upon their generally complex social context.
To assess the impact of this social environment on entrepreneurship requires simplifying models, implicit or explicit v . There is a close relationship between measuring and the higher level concept, modelling. Modelling involves the selection of abstract and measurable aspects of a phenomenon, such as entrepreneurship, so as to better understand it. A helpful approach to modelling is to distinguish between the supply of entrepreneurs (persons with appropriate risk attitudes, resources, information and so on) and the demand, or opportunities, for entrepreneurs (Casson 1982 ). An extension is to focus on the culture in which the entrepreneur operates as the determinant of opportunities (Casson 1992 (Casson , 1998 . In any clearly defined business environment such models usually imply that there will be ideal production and marketing decisions with which in principle less satisfactory choices can be compared.
The present chapter first discusses the implications of identifying entrepreneurs with business founders, and the corresponding measure of entrepreneurship, the number of new firms established. The supply of entrepreneurship can then be analysed as a choice between employment, self-employment and, in some circumstances, unemployment. Either the well being, or the expected profit, income or wealth, from the employment options are the objects of choice. Profit or wealth is therefore examined as a possible indicator of entrepreneurial performance in particular contexts. The determinants of entrepreneurship are the factors that influence the choice of employment. Credit rationing is especially worth considering, since even small businesses require capital, which may not always accompany entrepreneurial talent. Distinctive historical measurement and estimation problems, including those arising from entrepreneurial culture and social mobility, are addressed in some detail.
The chapter then addresses measures of entrepreneurial optimisation, focussing first on choice of technique of production and then on total factor productivity indices that embody this choice, distinguishing aggregate performance from that of the individual entrepreneur. Examples show how the choice of production technique approach can be extended to product selection and entrepreneurial success, as well as quantifying the gains from reducing the dispersion in entrepreneurial performance.
Entrepreneurship as Firm Formation
A common approach is to focus on becoming an entrepreneur, defined as the decision to start a firm or to become self-employed. Not all, or perhaps most, new firm founders would meet the 'innovativeness' requirement of entrepreneurship. In principle a successful entrepreneurial subset of firm founders can be defined as those earning more than they could as employees, after allowing for the opportunity costs of other resources employed. This definition has the merit of excluding firm founders who are prepared to earn less than their wage in employment simply in order to be self-employed, or to work in a different location.
A standard quantitative specification for studying entrepreneurs as firm founders involves the choice between employment and self-employment, according to expected income (Hudson 1987) , or to the utility derived from the options (perhaps stemming from the attitude to risk). The key equation typically explains the probability of choosing self-employment rather than employment. Perhaps the most widely used approach to modelling the choice between types of income is based upon Evans and Jovanocic (1989) . Here self-employment income is determined by a production function with an entrepreneurial efficiency parameter and dependent upon experience and human and financial capital. From this production function is subtracted the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur's capital that would be tied up in the firm.
The principle that more competent entrepreneurs will demand more capital (other things being equal) was utilised in a study of nineteenth century Greek entrepreneurs (Foreman-Peck and Pepelasis Minoglou 2000) . It appeared that entrepreneurs operating abroad as well as in Greece had stronger than average demands for capital, perhaps because they could seize, or at least identify, more opportunities in the wider geographical market.
What determines the duration of survival of a start-up business (for example Taylor 1999) and its exit (Robson 1996) 
Entrepreneurial Profit, Income or Wealth
A way of addressing one objection to firm creation as an entrepreneurial measurethat many start-ups involve no innovation or novelty-is to focus on profit, income or wealth generated by the businesses. In a competitive economy like nineteenth century Britain, where statutory monopoly was insignificant, profitability was a signal that a business was delivering what the market requires. Other things being equal, a firm with higher productivity than its competitors will be adding more value and making more profits. The entrepreneur receives profits and accumulates some, either as corporate or personal wealth.
Until recent periods data on the income of self-employed versus the employed has been in limited supply. But wealth at death is often available from wills (see Rubinstein (1981) for Britain and Daumard (1973) There is also a sampling issue to be addressed in drawing inferences from wealth at death data. The precision of the estimate of an entrepreneurial characteristic depends not on the proportion of the relevant population sampled, but on the size of the sample and on the nature of the sampling procedure. Suppose, for example, the selection of entrepreneurs in the British Dictionary of Business Biography (DBB) was influenced by editorial interest in manufacturing industry, stemming from the traditional historiography of the Industrial Revolution. In this case the sample could be misleading as a guide to the relative importance of entrepreneurial wealth from finance and commerce in British industry as a whole , Rubinstein 2000 , Nicholas 2000 viii .
On the other hand the fact that the DBB contains only a small proportion of the wealthy entrepreneurs in the period studied is not a source of error in 8 itself. The precision with which sample characteristics can be measured depends on the size not on the proportion of the sample.
Does the focus on successful entrepreneurs bias conclusions? Genuine risk taking must involve failure, but so long as those who failed were simply unlucky, characteristics of winners and losers will be similar. Where gradations of entrepreneurial success are measured, there may be no reason to suppose the fewness of observations at the failure end of the spectrum is not compensated by the adjacent relatively poorly performing entrepreneurs. As to the social impact of bankrupt entrepreneurs, if the market works reasonably well and the value of an entrepreneurs assets -be they telegraph cables or buildings-exceeds their liabilities, this is a signal that entrepreneurship has subtracted rather than added from society's economic wellbeing. In practice, matters may be more nuanced, and historians have shown interest in gallant failures as well as successes.
Rationing Credit to Entrepreneurs
A potential entrepreneur unable to borrow enough may be constrained to start a firm There is a long literature about credit rationing by banks based upon asymmetric information between lender and entrepreneur borrower. Individual entrepreneurs are assumed to know how risky are their prospective debts but lenders do not. It is often supposed that only poor credit risks would be willing to pay high interest rates on debt -on the grounds that if they are unlucky they will go bankrupt and not pay at all. So to avoid this 'adverse selection' banks choose to ration their loans by quantity rather than by higher interest rates.
At higher interest rates, existing borrowers may switch to riskier projects. Thus, a lender's expected return will eventually fall as the interest rate charged to borrowers increases (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) . At higher interest rates, safe enterprises are hardest hit; although they have greater chances of repayment, they are obliged to pay rates appropriate to risky business. They drop out of the market, leaving only firms with a high risk of default. One solution to this problem is to cap the interest rate on loans and ration lenders. Insofar as starting successful businesses requires a threshold level of capital, this policy may reduce start-ups. Hence entrepreneurs who can call upon more equity, through family, friends or inheritance, may be more likely to found a flourishing firm.
Subsequent theoretical analysis has suggested over-lending is at least as probable as this predicted under-lending. The rich will be able to take more equity and so the gearing of their start-up firms (not subject to financial constraints) will be lower (De Meza and Webb 1999) . If new, less able, borrowers enter the market with consequently higher risk proposals, as interest rates increase, then the overall risk of lenders' portfolios also rises (de Meza and Webb 1987) . In contrast to the previous (Stiglitz and Weiss' 1981) model, lower risk borrowers do not drop out of the market.
In these circumstances lower risk borrowers subsidise the higher risk projects and there is excessive entry. As entrepreneurial wealth rises, excessive entry is reduced and start-ups fall. Entrepreneurs hold more equity in their projects and therefore take fewer inordinate risks.
How do we tell which model is appropriate, whether bank lending creates too many or too few entrepreneurs? 23.8 per cent of 453 cases of English banks refusing to make loans to industrialists between the 1860s and 1914 involved new firms (Capie and Collins 1996) . New businesses were more likely to fail the standard capital adequacy criteria. Does this mean that start-ups were unwarrantedly deprived of funds? New firms were unlikely to account for as much as 23.8% of loan applicants in any period, so they do appear to have been disproportionately penalised, but possibly quite correctly. Measurement without theory or a standard of comparison cannot take us far.
Similarly a more extensive study (Capie and Collins 1999) showed that a sizeable proportion of bank loans to industry were granted without the deposit of tangible collateral ix . A rational banker would grant an unsecured loan if the company was considered extremely reliable, but entirely new firms could not fall into that category.
It is no surprise then that for a collection of twentieth century firm founders, capital was overwhelmingly derived from the individual's own resources or those of a partner. Only four per cent of the sample obtained their capital from a bank (Shaw 1992) . But this might only imply that bank terms were relatively expensive or imposed an unacceptable loss of control or constraint upon business, not necessarily credit rationing. A study of British bank lending to start-up firms in the 1980s found allocation according to a wide range of human capital variables and no need to invoke any rationing effect (Cressy 1996) .
If banks rationed credit by loans size instead of entirely by interest rate charged, higher interest rates might encourage banks to lend to riskier prospects and thereby increase new firm formation. In fact the opposite effect has been estimated. Interwar
British company formation was negatively related to interest rates, as might be expected if there was no credit rationing (Hudson 1989) x . Using selected start-up data for the Second Empire French economy a similar impact is found. Also for nineteenth
Greece there is evidence that financial turbulence reduced start ups. The depreciation of the exchange rate predicts a fall in the general level of firm start-ups in the 1890s xi .
Supposedly, evidence for rationing has been the finding that the chances of selfemployment in the US were influenced by financial asset ownership (eg Evans and Jovanovic 1989) . But there are other explanations. A correlation between assets and self-employment could stem from entrepreneurs foregoing more leisure than others to accumulate wealth, so that they can start a business (as Quadrini (2002) found for the present day US).
Entrepreneurship and Inheritance
If inheritors show a higher propensity to self-employment then this need not be taken as evidence of unreasonably credit constrained start-ups; more equity reduces the risk of firm formation and should therefore encourage it. Some self-employment may be merely inheritance of established family firms, the value of which is included in inherited financial assets. The (British) National Child Development Survey provides an unusual longitudinal data set that allows the study of wealth and other correlates of self-employment (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Burke, Fitzroy and Nolan 2000) .
It follows a cohort born in one week in March 1958 to 1991. Inheritances of financial gifts increase the probability of self-employment. More recent inheritances decrease the chances of self-employment. Up to a threshold of £70000 inheritance increases job creation, but above that level exercises a negative effect.
The foregoing reasoning about the operation of capital markets can be extended from the choice of self-employment to entrepreneurial wealth at death as a performance measure xii . With capital markets in which there was neither credit rationing nor overlending there should be no relationship between entrepreneurs' inherited wealth and their wealth at death. Entrepreneurial performance would be independent of the size of the entrepreneur's equity stake from inheritance. In reality then, the importance of inherited wealth should vary according to capital market 'imperfection' and particular business needs for capital xiii .
Historical inheritance data brings its own difficulties. Often when a father's wealth at death can be identified, the assumption that it is all left to a particular person cannot be tested. Father's wealth at death is not the same as inherited wealth and thus wealth utilisable for business.
Measuring Cultural Influences
Religion and the education patterns of entrepreneurs are commonly studied influences More systematically, the influences of formal human capital (Bates 1990; Cowling, Mitchell and Taylor 1997) and informal human capital, as measured by second generation proprietors (Lentz and Laban 1990 ), on entrepreneurship -or selfemployment-have been estimated for recent times. In contemporary Britain regression analysis of panel data showed that formal education reduces the probability of becoming an entrepreneur-which could be interpreted as consistent with Wiener's thesis. But University education raises income, given that a person is self-employed (Burke et al 2000) . Father's occupation has some influence in the direction of the heritability of entrepreneurship.
Unlike historical analysis, for contemporary entrepreneurs there is scope to use questionnaires to measure culture, as expressed in subject attitudes. This typically involves ordinal scale measures. In their study of networking, Drakopoulou Dodd and Patra (2002) found that Greek entrepreneurs were highly authoritarian, outranking those of Japan and Italy (as well as the UK and the US) on the 'power-distance' measure. The variable is one of Geert Hofstede's (1980) four dimensions of culture that have proved enormously popular in cross-cultural comparisons of influences upon entrepreneurial behaviour. The measures are;
• Individualism: The degree of individual or group orientation
The level of preference for equality or inequality within groups
• Certainty: The preference for risk vs. structure
• Achievement: The relative degrees of relationship vs. task orientation. This dimension also tracks the relative masculine and feminine influences in the workplace 'Power-distance' in particular measures subjects' valuations of the interpersonal power or influence between superior and subordinate; in a culture with high power distance, subordinates defer to superiors and do not question their authority.
To obtain measures of 'power-distance', a block of statements are presented to entrepreneurs, such as "In work-related matters, managers have a right to expect obedience from their subordinates" and, "Employees should not express disagreements with their managers." The subject is then asked to score their reaction to the statement on a (seven point) scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The scores are added up to produce the power-distance index for the respondent xiv . Possibly there may be scope for scoring certain historical cultural material in this fashion.
A 'Cronbach alpha' figure is sometimes presented with the index mean and variance.
This statistic shows how consistent the responses to the different statements have been. When the average inter-statement correlation is low, the Cronbach alpha score is low. A 'high' score is taken to confirm that a genuine 'latent construct' has been identified.
Measuring Entrepreneurial Social Mobility
Entrepreneurship ensures that 'the upper strata of society are like hotels which are indeed always full of people, but people who are forever changing' according to Joseph Schumpeter (1961; 156) . This does not mean that the new arrivals originate from the lowest strata of society and anyway there have been other channels than business for upward and downward mobility in Western societies. Changes in the characteristics of the US elite over the twentieth century were restricted to the political, rather than to the business, membership (Temin 1999) . In western Europe, where state intervention has been more pervasive, business elites seem to have become more open than in America; upward mobility was apparently greater (Kaelble, 1980; Cassis, 1997) . The probability of the second column is preferable for analysis of mobility into the elite because the small size of the elite group compared with others-such as all manual workers-means that the mobility probabilities are otherwise extremely small and therefore particularly vulnerable to sampling error (Temin 1999 ).
Comparison of the 0.0009 and the 0.013 hints at the magnitude of the difference between the two measures, which is far more extreme with the much smaller size of the elite than class I. There is a case for studying instead the chances of originating in a particular social group and being in the elite. The relation between this measure and the more conventional index depends on the relative sizes of the social group in question and the elite, being determined by the inverse probability rule xv .
Cross-tabulations, such as Table 4 .1, are limited in their value for explaining the causes of mobility because there are potentially a considerable number of variables at work, the effect of each of which must be isolated. A more powerful formulation is written;
where P ij , the probability of any elite member i originating in one of two groups, such as 'upper class' and 'all other classes', depends on Xi, a variety of 
Entrepreneurship as Choice of Technique
Successful entrepreneurs may be driven by a variety of motives, but if they work in a competitive market economy, they must pursue a strategy that makes profits and they must be efficient in some respects. These are conditions for survival and success, independent of motive and other consequences such as economic growth, which will normally accompany such behaviour (Payne 2002) . In a competitive environment, profits will be earned only by effective innovation in products and processes.
An innovation must be modelled at a level of generality that assumes away innovativeness; a new technique might be represented as a combination of factors of production in a particular industry for instance, although it is also much more than this. The efficient choice of technique approach is presented in figure 4.1. To display the logic, the axes could represent skilled and unskilled labour or raw materials and other inputs instead of capital and labour.
Figure 4.1 Efficient and inefficient entrepreneurs HERE
The first point demonstrated by the model is that entrepreneurs cannot be assumed incompetent merely because they employ a different technique from that in another firm or economy if their circumstances also differ. The classic controversy in British economic historiography concerned the later nineteenth century cotton industry, ring spinning in the US and mule spinning in the UK. US and British entrepreneurs chose respectively B and A in figure 1 (Sandberg 1974) . Given the different costs of factors of production in the two economies, each point could be cost minimising in the different environments. The US uses more capital than Britain to produce a given output (say); American capital productivity is lower at K 2 , compared with British entrepreneurs' K 1. But because labour is more expensive (better paid) in the US, American entrepreneurs' employ less labour per unit of output, choose a higher level of labour productivity L 2 , compared with Britain's L 1 .
An entrepreneur adopting a technique D could not be accused of incompetence.
Although labour productivity is lower than the US technique at B, capital productivity is higher. A related argument can be presented relative to the British technique at A.
These positions so far do not demonstrate that different techniques were justified, only that they could be, if the prices of inputs were appropriate. Technique B is not dominated by technique A -unlike C. An entrepreneur at C produces less output per unit of capital and labour than an entrepreneur at A. C is dominated by A; this is a type of entrepreneurial failure that emerges from the 'choice of technique' model.
In fact improved measurement has shown that labour productivity was higher in
Lancashire than in New England; L 2 was to the left of L 1 (Leunig 2003) . Unless
American cotton textile entrepreneurs achieved greater productivity with other factors, their technique was inferior to that of the British. It turns out that US productivity in raw materials and energy was lower as well, so that American productive efficiency was indeed below that of the British industry.
Typically entrepreneurship involves utilising a variety of inputs, and sometimes they are unique to an economy or an individual. The nineteenth century British paper industry adopted esparto grass from Spain as a raw material for paper, to substitute for the rags that did not increase in supply sufficiently as paper demand expanded (Magee 1997) . By contrast the US industry opted for wood pulp, producing paper of lower quality. During the 1890s US productivity drew ahead of Britain's, not because of the raw materials, but because there were scale economies in the industry that America could exploit and the slower growing smaller British market could not.
The model represented in figure 4.1 implicitly assumes constant returns to scale.
Larger industries are no different from smaller. All that matters is input ratios. In the above account, the capital-intensive continuous flow nature of paper production instead meant that larger throughputs reduced unit costs. Technique A could dominate technique C simply because the volume of output entrepreneur A could sell was so much greater than could entrepreneur C.
Where scale matters an economy or entrepreneurial firm might be able to produce more efficiently with every input combination, if output is everywhere greater. In this case total factor productivity (TFP) would be higher. In figure 4 .2, the frontier A' D' B' is everywhere above A D B. Entrepreneurs with frontier A'D'B' are more successful than those with A D B, though perhaps for reasons for which they themselves are not responsible. Whatever inputs they have available will be used more efficiently.
Figure 4.2 Entrepreneurs operating at a higher and lower total factor productivity HERE
The total factor productivity measure of entrepreneurial performance can also be offered in dynamic form. An entrepreneur or economy is more successful than another when total factor productivity growth is higher (for example Nicholas 1982 , Thomas 1985 , Nicholas 1985 . The drawback with this approach, as the economies of scale example suggests, is that circumstances beyond control of the entrepreneur may underlie the differential rates of shift. Attributing causation to entrepreneurs in these circumstances transforms empirically falsifiable theory into metaphysics.
Entrepreneurs are here held responsible for outcomes, in the sense of accountable, regardless of whether they might plausibly be expected to have altered them. As a way of measuring entrepreneurship the TFP growth approach is therefore seriously flawed.
Measuring Entrepreneurial Choices: Data Envelopment and Stochastic Frontiers
As the above analysis shows, with knowledge of all entrepreneurs' input combinations it is possible to calculate which techniques were efficient-on a frontierand which were inefficient or dominated. Where there are large numbers of entrepreneurs whose performance is to be examined, more systematic techniques are available. An efficiency or performance benchmark requires not only information about outputs and inputs of the types discussed above, but also weights and formulae for combining them. Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 1977 ) is a development of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. The approach can be conceived as assigning the weights to, say, a set of inputs by entrepreneurs in a common production process that provide the best fit between these inputs and the entrepreneurs' outputs. Unlike DEA, the weights are common to all entrepreneurs.
Whereas OLS regression generates weights on the assumption that the unexplained variation in the output or the dependent variable is symmetrically distributed around a zero mean, SFA, as the name suggest, instead adopts the assumption that the relationship is a frontier or envelope. SFA estimates an asymmetrically distributed 
The Relative Efficiency of French Entrepreneurs of the Second Empire
To demonstrate SFA and DEA in practice, figure 4.3 is an empirical counterpart to figure 4 .3 implies -the SFA analysis that introduces error terms ranks him fourth, around 25% less efficient than Vrau, who in turn is some way behind the frontier (u is not zero). However they are very close together when the full range of u terms is considered. By far the worst performer in both the SFA and the DEA is Cardevac xix . 
The Efficiency of Entrepreneurial Product Strategies: Motor Cars in Britain 1902
The frontier approach can be employed to assess the relative effectiveness of entrepreneurs' products as well as processes, especially when market share data is not available, and/or when consumers' responses are lagged. In a competitive market for differentiated goods such as cars, the price (P) will be higher if the goods supply more characteristics (X) that some buyers want. The way attributes are combined and how much they cost depend upon the technology embodied in the car model. Those models employing superior technology will either supply more desired characteristics for the same price than rivals, or the same attributes as competitors but at a lower price.
Either way, there will be a frontier of best practice technology marked out by superior car models. Behind the frontier less successful car technologies will be spread at greater distances, the less effective are the models in supplying desirable characteristics for a given price. Equation (4.3) describes this process..
Both error terms in (4.3) (v and u) may be normally distributed with means of zero.
Since only the modulus of u is included, only one side of that distribution appears, which allows the distribution of cars to be more or less close to the (stochastic)
frontier. If u is zero then the car is on the frontier. A similar formulation assumes u is an exponential distribution.
Turning to particular characteristics, if fuel consumption mattered to buyers then 'thirsty' vehicles would only be demanded at lower prices, other things being equal. If steam cars were inconvenient in some way relative to internal combustion cars then again, other things being equal they would be sold at a discount.
The British market from 1896 was at first dominated by French models, but by 1902 domestic makes were selling well, and US steamers were also new entrants. New entrants should be close to the price/cost frontier, whereas buyer inertia, or switching costs, allow established products to be further away. Of the forty three cars competing in the 1902 RAC Trial for which data is available, eight were steamers (two French, Gardner-Serpollets, and six American, Whites and Locomobiles). Fourteen were Assuming that the parameters of equation 4 in table 4.4 determined the frontier, the 20hp (British) Wolseley was the most efficient, followed closely by the (British)
Brooke and two (US) Locomobiles. Most inefficient were two French cars-one of the cheapest, the single cylinder Renault, and one of the most expensive, the £1150 15 hp
Panhard. This appears to show that by 1902 British motor entrepreneurs were recovering from the handicap of the 'Red Flag' legislation xx , and at least in the home market were beginning to challenge the supremacy of the French industry.
Conclusion
Measurement of entrepreneurship provides opportunities to advance the historical study of entrepreneurship to some extent independently of particular models and theories. But quantitative study requires some precision in definitions for the problem in hand-beginning with who is and who is not, an entrepreneur.
A standard framework involves the choice of self-employment versus employment and unemployment. In itself this does not exclusively identify entrepreneurs as generally accepted because of the requirement for a link with effective innovation.
Hence the need for supplementary measures such as profit, income or wealth in a competitive market economy. For historical entrepreneurship, wealth at death is an obvious measure but the interpretation of this variable in different contexts must be undertaken with care. Among other reasons this is because consumption must be subtracted from income or retained profits before an entrepreneur's wealth at death is reasonable measure of cumulated lifetime profits, and consumption may vary systematically between different groups and locations.
Credit availability is often said to limit either the opportunities or the supply of entrepreneurs. Consideration of models of lending and borrowing with imperfect information together with some empirical evidence suggest that the contentions are hard to demonstrate, beyond the truism that if resources were not scarce there would be more of everything, including entrepreneurship. The re-appraisal of the significance of inheritance for the over-or under-lending hypotheses is a case in point; both positions predict that inheritance will be correlated with business start-ups and so the observed association is consisted with both, and no doubt many other, hypotheses.
The influence of culture upon entrepreneurship has provided an opportunity for many impression-based generalisations upon which even cross-tabulations can improve. For a variety of aspects of culture are readily measurable, even without the questionnaire approach that is available for the study of contemporary entrepreneurs. Correlation between attributes such as class and religion or religion and education can however limit the reliability of inferences drawn from cross-tabulations and multivariate analysis is therefore generally preferable. Entrepreneurship impacts upon national culture through social mobility to join, dilute and challenge traditional elites. The extent to which business, rather than other channels or influences, brought members of different social classes into the elite can be fruitfully studied with regression-type categorical dependent variable models ( such as multinomial logit).
Measurable models of entrepreneurship can set out more objective standards and tests 
Endnotes
i Even the first level of measurement, with a nominal scale, requires distinguishing entrepreneurs from others, so that for instance they can be counted. A higher level of measurement, such as with an ordinal scale, is necessary to be able to answer 'How well do entrepreneurs do what they do?'; to assess whether this entrepreneur was more successful than that, but less successful than another. When an entrepreneur is said to have died twice as wealthy as a second, a still more demanding interval measurement scale is employed.
ii The greater price inelasticity of demand for new products suggests that their consumers' surplus is greater than that of mature products. If so the contribution to well-being from the introduction of new relative to established goods and services would be under-estimated. Measuring the characteristics of products with hedonic price indices could solve the problem. If a new product has more desired attributes for a given price than existing products, it is superior. But the new product will only register as a productivity improvement when the output of established firms, as well as product innovators, are measured in characteristics.
iii Or sometimes the hijacking by large corporations of opportunities identified by individual entrepreneurs, another form of monopoly power associated with profit. For a comparative study of the causes of intrapreneurship in the contemporary US and South Africa see Morris et al (2001) . iv Only when the CEO moves between companies with different market positioning and in different phases of the economic cycle is there some chance of identifying a genuine 'intrapreneur' effect. Otherwise an apparent impact may be merely good luck. The theory of managerial labour markets (Fama 1980 ) sets out the conditions for market identification of managerial impact. There is evidence in recent years of a significant and positive correlation between directors' pay, company performance, and size in Britain (Conyon 1998) . There is also a negative, and significant association of CEO turnover with prior shareholder returns. This is consistent with the view that CEOs are disciplined by the threat of dismissal and their performance when successful is also rewarded. However there is a good deal of randomness in the reward process. CEOs may be remunerated for being at the helm at the right time and punished for factors entirely beyond their control. v Although of course it is possible simply to describe the social background without attributing causation, for example Levy-Leboyer (1979) , Slaven and Kim (1992) and Jeremy (1984) respectively for France, Scotland and England. Cassis (1997) compares characteristics of business leaders of the top 100 companies in Britain, France and Germany at selected dates. Burns (1999) compares contemporary entrepreneurs characteristics across Europe. vi Jobert and Moss (1990) supply a selection of papers on Britain and France which can suggest some of the impact of these alternative environments.
vii Bartelsman et al's OECD study (2003) shows US firms have lower 'infant mortality' than the UK; indeed UK mortality is higher than any other country in the study except Finland. viii London wealth (and therefore presumably finance and commerce) declined in relative importance between 1809 and 1899, but remained dominant.
ix Wholly unsecured loans were particularly important in the 1880s and still represented over one-quarter of industrial loans in the years before World War I.
x In any case, the majority of start-ups were not registered companies. These were typically quite large and might often have had a business existence prior to registration. xi General credit rate series, as a contributor to the factor price of capital, are unavailable and inappropriate, but the exchange rate is a measure of financial confidence.
For the small open Greek economy, the interest parity condition, that interest rate differentials between monetary areas will reflect expected exchange rate movements, supports this proxy. An unanticipated demand for financing at home by the government pushing up interest rates and prices will cause a compensating expected depreciation of the drachma exchange rate. xii Assuming the life-cycle theory of consumption does not hold and that instead individuals accumulate wealth as if they and their families or posterity are an immortal entity. xiii An attempt to calculate an internal rate of return (IRR) from inheritance and wealth at death presupposes or imposes a particular value on the inheritance coefficient that implicitly averages these effects . Insofar as the quadratic relation between inheritance and start-ups found by Burke et al (2000) extends to entrepreneurial performance, the assumed linear relation of the IRR calculation could be misleading. xiv Different weighting schemes might in some cases change the values of this aggregated variable. xv Let E signify elite membership and Xi originating from class i, then Temin proposes considering P(XiE), whereas the conventional social mobility focus would be P(E|Xi) (which is extremely small). The relation between these, given by the inverse probability rule, is P(EXi)= [P(XiE).P(E)]/P(Xi). If we know the chances of being in the elite (P(E)) and the chances of originating in class i (P(Xi)) then we can calculate the probability of being in the elite having originated in class i (P(EXi)) from the chances of originating in class i, given that the person is in the elite (P(Xi E)). xvi The function, f, that links the probability of being in one category rather than another to explanatory variables, is usually assumed to be cumulative logistic or normal. xvii DEA originated with Michael Farrell's 1957 paper on 'The Measurement of Productive Efficiency' (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978), xviii This exposition follows conventional treatments that generally assume very inefficient units will be few. Competitive forces tend to eliminate them, while ensuring that most units cluster close to the frontier.. xix Cardevac's inefficiency term is 17 times as great as Kuhlman's but the SFA efficiency terms are not normalised like the DEA scores to take into account units of measurement. xx The legislation, repealed in 1896, required that a person with a red flag walk in front of any self-propelled vehicle driven on the public roads.
